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Abstract
In our recent work (Bubeck, Price, Razenshteyn, arXiv:1805.10204) we argued that adver-
sarial examples in machine learning might be due to an inherent computational hardness of
the problem. More precisely, we constructed a binary classification task for which (i) a robust
classifier exists; yet no non-trivial accuracy can be obtained with an efficient algorithm in (ii)
the statistical query model. In the present paper we significantly strengthen both (i) and (ii):
we now construct a task which admits (i’) a maximally robust classifier (that is it can tolerate
perturbations of size comparable to the size of the examples themselves); and moreover we prove
computational hardness of learning this task under (ii’) a standard cryptographic assumption.
1 Introduction
We refer to our prior work [2] (henceforth referred to as BPR) for context and references about the
emerging field of robust machine learning. Our primary goal in the present paper is to describe
in the simplest possible way our new conceptual contribution, namely that even assuming the
existence of a maximally robust classifier one cannot hope in general to attain efficiently any kind
of robustness whatsoever, and that this impossibility result can be obtained from a widely-accepted
computational hardness assumption.
Let us start by briefly recalling the general setting and the BPR result. Basic binary classifi-
cation can be phrased as follows: given poly(n) i.i.d. samples from two distributions D0 and D1
supported on Rn, find (if possible in poly(n) time) a set A ⊂ Rn such that
P
X∼D0
(X ∈ A) ≥ 0.99 , and P
X∼D1
(X 6∈ A) ≥ 0.99 . (1)
The ε-robust version asks for the following more stringent requirement:
P
X∼D0
(B(X, ε) ∈ A) ≥ 0.99 , and P
X∼D1
(B(X, ε) 6∈ A) ≥ 0.99 , (2)
where B(x, ε) = {z ∈ Rn : ‖z − x‖ ≤ ε}. In this paper we restrict our attention to the Euclidean
norm case (however the same results hold say for ℓ∞ norm). We refer to the set A as a classifier, and
we say that it is amaximally robust classifier if it satisfies (2) with ε = Θ(maxi∈{0,1} diam(supp(Di)).
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Current state of the art machine learning essentially fails at the robust task (2) for large-scale
problems. BPR identified four mutually exclusive possibilities to explain this current state of affair:
1. No robust classifier exists.
2. Identifying a robust classifier requires too much training data.
3. Identifying a robust classifier from limited training data is information theoretically possible
but computationally intractable.
4. We just have not found the right algorithm yet.
BPR provides evidence in favor of hypothesis 3 by constructing a binary classification task that
admits a classifier robust to Euclidean perturbations of size log1/2−ε n (while with high probability
any sample has norm O(
√
n)), yet finding any non-trivial robust classifier (even for arbitrarily small
perturbations, and with probability of correctness only slightly better than chance) is hard in the
statistical query model (we refer to BPR for a discussion of the statistical query model, including
its weaknesses). In the present paper we significantly strengthen this result, while at the same time
providing a much simpler proof. Our main contribution is to construct a binary classification task
which admits a classifier robust to perturbations of size Ω(
√
n) (i.e., a maximally robust classifier),
yet finding any non-trivial robust classifier (even for arbitrarily small perturbations, and with
probability of correctness only slightly better than chance) is impossible in polynomial time under
a standard cryptographic assumption (namely, quadratic residuosity assumption).
We prove this new result in Section 3, where our main tool will be trapdoor pseudorandom
generators (PRG). As a warm-up we start in Section 2 by providing a refinement of hypothesis 1
based on a simple observation with classical PRGs.
2 An addendum to hypothesis 1
The basis of the present work is the observation that there is missing case in the four BPR hypothe-
ses: the problem could admit a robust classifier f , which is “easy to find” (say it is even given),
but is intractable to compute (in the sense that the mapping x 7→ f(x) is hard to compute). To
put it differently, a more appropriate version of hypothesis 1 would have been:
1’. No efficiently computable robust classifier exists.
Let us now give a concrete construction that shows that hypothesis 1 and 1’ are fundamentally
different. Precisely we will exhibit a binary classification task that admits a maximally robust
classifier, yet any efficiently computable classifier has an accuracy close to random guessing.
Let G : {0, 1}n/2 → {0, 1}n be a PRG. Let D0 be uniform on {0, 1}n and D1 be the distribution of
G(s) for s uniform in {0, 1}n/2. Clearly a simple volume argument shows that there exists a classifier
A which satisfies (2) for ε = Θ(
√
n) (i.e., this problem admits a maximally robust classifier). Yet
by definition of a PRG no polynomial time algorithm can have a non-trivial classification accuracy
(let alone robust accuracy).
3 Adversarial examples and trapdoor PRG
Given the addendum from Section 2, our goal is now to construct a classification task which admits
a maximally robust classifier that is also efficiently computable, yet one cannot get non-trivial
accuracy in polynomial time. The main idea here is to replace the PRG in the construction of
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Section 2 with a trapdoor PRG. In a nutshell a trapdoor PRG comes with a key, such that knowing
the key allows to efficiently distinguish the PRG from a true source of randomness (and thus allows
for efficient classification in the construction of Section 2). Note also that, by a simple union bound,
the sample complexity of such a problem would be of order of the number of bits in the key.
Let us now detail the construction a bit more. For the sake of concreteness, we use a specific
trapdoor PRG, namely the Blum–Blum–Shub PRG [1] (in its “backward” form). Let p and q be
large distinct prime numbers congruent to 3 mod 4, let N = pq and n = O(log(N)). The BBS PRG
GN : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ works as follow. First it maps the seed s ∈ {0, 1}n to x0 ∈ N a quadratic
residue mod N in such a way that a uniformly random seed gives a nearly-uniform quadratic residue
modulo N . Next it iteratively takes square roots mod N , that is let xi+1 be such that xi = x
2
i+1
mod N and xi+1 is a quadratic residue itself (this is well-defined per our assumption on p and q).
The ith element of the output of GN is then simply the parity of xi.
The key property of the BBS PRG is that, without knowing the factorization N = pq, its
output is computationally indistinguishable (under the quadratic residuosity assumption) from a
true source of randomness (even when the seed is known), while on the other hand knowing the
factorization allows for efficient distinguishing. To make this mathematically precise let us recall the
notion of computational statistical distance for a family of pairs of distribution {(D0(ω),D1(ω)), ω ∈
Ω}: it is the supremum over all polynomial-time algorithms of the infimum over ω ∈ Ω of the
success probability one can have to identify whether a random sample was generated from D0(ω)
or generated from D1(ω). Let us fix some constant c > 1 and denote Dn0 = unif({0, 1}n
c
) and
Dn1 (N) the distribution of the first nc bits of s ◦ GN (s) where s is a uniformly random element of
{0, 1}n.
Theorem 3.1 ([1, 4, 3]). Assuming that for infinitely many N the computational statistical dis-
tance of {(Dn0 ,Dn1 (pq))}p,q is greater than 1/2 + 1/poly(n) would refute the quadratic residuosity
assumption.
On the other hand, if p and q are known, then the computational statistical distance of {(Dn0 ,Dn1 (N))}
is 1− on(1).
From the above discussion we have the following properties for the classification task described
by the family {(Dn0 ,Dn1 (pq))}p,q:
a. The (robust) sample complexity of this family is O(n).
b. Any task in this family admits a maximally robust classifier (same volume argument as in
Section 2) that is also efficiently computable (second statement in Theorem 3.1).
c. Under the quadratic residuosity assumption, any polynomial time learning algorithm for this
family has an accuracy close to chance on some task in the family (first statement in Theorem
3.1).
We also note that, using the BPR trick of adding a dummy coordinate revealing the label, one
could replace property c by c’ and add property d as follows (for any fixed ε > 0):
c’. Under the quadratic residuosity assumption, any polynomial time learning algorithm for this
family has a ε-robust accuracy close to chance on some task in the family.
d. One can achieve (1) in polynomial time (and polynomial sample complexity).
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